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Abstract
The size and sign of the government spending multiplier crucially depends on how
the spending is financed and how consumers respond to implied future tax increases. I
investigate this issue in an estimated New Keynesian DSGE model with distortionary labor
and capital taxes and, importantly, with preferences that allow the wealth effect on labor
supply to vary. Specifically I assess whether the model can explain the empirical evidence
for the United States and examine the transmission mechanism, for realistic policy rules.
I show that the model can match the positive empirical response of key variables including
output, consumption and the real wage. I find that the role of the wealth effect on labor
supply is small and that while tax rates rise following a spending shock these increases are
modest, with debt rising. Deficit financed spending increases are therefore expansionary,
but this is due to sticky prices rather than the wealth effect channel.
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1 Introduction
The effectiveness of government spending in stimulating the economy became a central policy
question during the 2008 financial crisis. Whilst proponents and critics argued about the mech-
anisms determining policy success, standard macroeconomic models can generate a wide range
of theoretical predictions depending on the assumptions made about how the spending increase
is financed and assumptions about how consumers respond to implied future tax increases.
The empirical literature1 tends to find that GDP increases following a temporary shock to
government spending. But from both an academic and policy perspective, an important question
is why. And can a relatively standard modern macro model explain the findings observed in the
time-series literature? The contribution of this paper is to investigate this issue by constructing
and estimating a New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model but particularly focusing
on the endogenous response of tax rates and debt to government spending and the strength of
the so-called ‘wealth effect’ on labor supply.
Many neoclassical and New Keynesian models share the ability to replicate the expansionary
nature of government spending increases. As is well-known, one of the most important channels
is a negative wealth effect from higher lump sum taxes that generates a sizable increase in hours
worked and output. In reality, however, governments levy distortionary, rather than lump sum,
taxes.2 Moreover, it is not obvious a priori that this ‘wealth effect’ channel — that government
spending is expansionary because it makes consumers poorer — is quantitatively important in
practice.
As shown by Baxter and King (1993), abandoning the lump sum tax assumption has sig-
nificant implications in neoclassical models. If the extra government spending is fully financed
by distortionary taxes every period, GDP will fall rather than increase. Burnside et al. (2004)
therefore conclude that models which rely on lump sum taxes may produce misleading predic-
1For example Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009) using SVAR methods and
Ramey (2011) using narrative methods.
2Romer and Romer (2010) and Cloyne (2010) document that many spending-driven tax changes affected
marginal rates of tax. Furthermore, Drautzburg and Uhlig (2013) study how the financing of the recent American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act will ultimately be financed by movements in distortionary taxes.
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tions and assessing a model requires that it reflects a response of taxes that is “commensurate
with what occurred in the data” (p.90). These negative effects can, however, be offset as more
of the spending increase is deficit-financed. Due to Ricardian equivalence effects, deficit-finance
in neoclassical models also leads to a wealth effect on labor supply.3 However, if this channel is
weak in practice, even debt financed spending increases could be contractionary: the negative
effects of distortionary taxes are then likely to dominate. In New Keynesian models these con-
tractionary forces remain strong, although can be somewhat offset by demand effects stemming
from sticky prices.4
In assessing whether a model can account for the empirical evidence and the transmission
mechanisms of fiscal policy, it is therefore important to first consider the degree of distortionary
tax financing relative to debt financing. Second, to the extent that debt financing plays a role,
the wealth effect channel will then be of crucial importance in determining whether the spending
increase is expansionary.
I first estimate the empirical effects of a government spending shock in the United States
using the common Structural VAR method of Blanchard and Perotti (2002).5 The reason for
this is to produce a baseline set of empirical impulse responses as close as possible to the
existing literature. However, importantly — and unlike other papers — I estimate the response
of distortionary tax rates and government debt. I show that both debt and taxes rise following
a spending increase, although the increase is more debt financed (at least over the period
considered).
I then examine whether, and how, a relatively standard medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE
model can explain the evidence for plausible parameter values. As noted above, my focus is on
ensuring the model matches the paths of tax rates and debt found in the data while allowing
3Under certain assumptions, some of which are discussed later.
4Both Burnside et al. (2004) and Leeper et al. (2010) consider neoclassical flexible price models where tax
rates move slowly following a government spending shock and the wealth effect remains an important driver of
the positive output responses found.
5This methodology has been subject to concerns about whether the identified government spending shocks
might be anticipated (for example, in Ramey (2011)). Later, I therefore employ the tests suggested by Ramey
(2011) to guard against this concern.
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the wealth effect on labor supply to vary in strength. To incorporate this feature, I follow
Monacelli and Perotti (2009) who employ Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) preferences. Following
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) I estimate the size of this effect (although these authors do not
investigate the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy6). To my knowledge, this paper is the
first to empirically assess the role of the wealth effect in the transmission of fiscal policy, and
how this interacts with the financing of the shock. Other more common model features (such
as habits, monetary policy and capital utilization) that are well-known to matter for the effects
of fiscal policy are also included (see, for example, Leeper et al. (2011)).
I show that the estimated model can match the positive empirical response of key variables
including output, consumption and the real wage, which is a challenge for many New Keynesian
models, especially with a realistic set of tax instruments. The estimated model reveals three
important aspects of why government spending increases are expansionary in the data. First, I
find that the wealth effect on labor supply is small. Second, typical mechanisms such as sticky
prices, variable capital utilisation, investment adjustment costs and habits all play a role. Third,
distortionary tax rates rise following the expenditure shock but their small magnitude crucially
reduces the distortions involved. These three results imply that the debt-financed nature of the
spending increase is crucial for explaining the expansionary effect, although these expansionary
effects do not depend on the wealth effect channel, but rather the presence of sticky prices.
While the consequences of distortionary taxes have been set out by Baxter and King (1993),
McGrattan (1994) and others, only more recently have DSGE models begun to systematically
quantify their importance. The inclusion of distortionary tax rules are popular in an expanding
literature which investigates the effect of fiscal policy with DSGE models estimated using full
information methods. For example, Forni et al. (2009) (for the Euro Area) and Leeper et al.
(2010) and Zubairy (2013) (for the US) perform Bayesian estimation of models that include
feedback rules for tax rates from output and debt (but not government spending). Leeper et al.
(2010) consider the importance of different degrees of distortionary tax responses to debt, but
this model does not include sticky prices. Coenen et al. (2012) examine fiscal multipliers and the
6Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) focus more on the role of the wealth effect in the transmission of news
shocks.
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importance of different fiscal instruments across seven large-scale DSGE macro models.7 Uhlig
(2010) and Drautzburg and Uhlig (2013) focus on how future distortionary tax financing of
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act affects the overall impact of the programme. In
general, however, these papers do not consider the importance of the wealth effect and therefore
why debt financed spending increases may be more expansionary.
One important aspect of the estimated DSGE model literature is that it uses the estimated
model itself to identify the effects of fiscal policy in the data. In contrast, the contribution of
this paper is to examine how well a medium-scale DSGE model can account for, and help us
understand, time-series evidence typically found elsewhere in the literature. I therefore estimate
the model using limited information, minimum distance, methods which are particularly well
suited for this task.8
This paper also relates to the more theoretical literature. One part of this literature has
focused on why government spending shocks may have a positive effect on private consumption
see, for example, Linnemann and Schabert (2003), Zubairy (2009)9 and Ravn et al. (2012).
As noted above, the most relevant paper for my purpose is Monacelli and Perotti (2009) who
show that a low wealth effect on labor supply can potentially generate a positive response
of consumption in New Keynesian models with lump sum taxes. Leeper et al. (2011), also
in a relatively standard New Keynesian model, use predictive prior analysis to systematically
examine which features most influence the size of the government spending multiplier, but only
in theory. Other papers examine the issue of fiscal financing in theory, in more detail, for
example Woodford (2011).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 estimates the empirical effects
of government spending shocks. Section 3 sets up the theoretical model. Section 4 illustrates
key features of the model with respect to the tax policy rules, debt and the interaction with
the wealth effect channel. Section 5 estimates the model using a minimum distance estimator.
Section 6 concludes.
7Such as those used in Central Banks and other policy institutions.
8And this approach is in the spirit of Burnside et al. (2004) and Reis (2008).
9Who also follows a minimum distance approach but specifically examines the importance ‘deep habits’ in a
model with lump sum taxes.
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2 The empirical effects of fiscal policy
2.1 Identification
This section establishes the empirical macroeconomic effects of a government spending shock
that the model developed later should aim to explain. To remain as close as possible to the
existing structural vector auto-regression literature on this topic, government spending shocks
are identified using the method of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Specifically I estimate the
following VAR:
Xt = B(L)Xt−1 + ut. (1)
X = [gt τ
k τn y c n w i b]′ where g is government spending, τ k capital taxes, τn labor taxes,
y output, c consumption, n employment, w the real wage and i investment and government debt,
b. B(L) is a lag polynomial of order four, as is common. The VAR is estimated including a linear
trend. The vector X contains a range of variables we will be interested in later, particularly the
fiscal policy instruments.
As is well known, the reduced form residuals ut are likely to be correlated. To identify
the spending shock we follow the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) assumption that government
spending is unaffected contemporaneously (within the same quarter) by changes in the other
endogenous variables. This is justified by the institutional delays involved in policy decision-
making. While this paper does not attempt to contribute to the literature on identifying fiscal
shocks, this specification does allow me to study the effect of policy on labor and capital tax
rates, as well as the response of government debt. These results should be of interest in their own
right. Later, I will show that the theoretical model can jointly explain the relative magnitudes
of the movements in tax rates and debt.10
10A further reason for including a range of variables in the VAR is to help address concerns that typical SVARs
contain too little information and, as a result, the identified ‘shocks’ may be anticipated (see, for example, Ramey
(2011), Forni and Gambetti (2011), Mertens and Ravn (2010) and Leeper et al. (2012)). As a robustness check, I
therefore conduct the test suggested by Ramey (2011). Having estimated government spending shocks using the
SVAR, I examine whether these shocks are Granger caused by the Survey of Professional Forecasters expectations
of the changes in government spending one and four quarters ahead. I follow the specification in Ramey (2011)
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2.2 The data
The data are for the United States over the period 1955 Q1 to 2007 Q4. I exclude the Korean
War because it is, to some extent, a unique event and can disproportionately drive the results
(see Perotti (2007)). For a similar reason, I exclude the recent crisis period.
With the exception of the tax rates and debt, all data are taken directly from the relevant
sources, such as the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. The capital and labor tax rates are
constructed using the method outlined in Jones (2002). This approach is also adopted by
Burnside et al. (2004), and various others, and is closely related to Mendoza et al. (1994).
The debt series would ideally be ‘Debt Held by the Public’, as used by Favero and Giavazzi
(2007). However, this quarterly series does not go back far enough. I therefore construct a new
historical debt series from old paper editions of the U.S. Treasury Bulletin. The resulting series
is very close to ‘Debt Held by the Public’, see Appendix A for details.11
All variables, except the tax rates, are the log of real per capita variables. The tax rates are
percentages. All real series are the nominal series deflated by its own implicit price deflator,
with the exception of government spending and debt which are deflated by the GDP deflator.
Appendix A sets out the specific details of each series.
2.3 Results
The figures below report the baseline results. The impulse response functions are simulations to
a one percent structural shock to government spending. The point estimates are shown together
with non-parametric bootstrapped confidence intervals using 10,000 replications.12
and use the SPF data available from Valerie Ramey’s website. For the VAR above, reassuringly, I do not find
that the government spending shocks are Granger caused by the forecasts, with p-values above 0.4. Of course
this does not mean that anticipated shocks are unimportant. In fact, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) argue
that a third of government spending shocks are still unanticipated, suggesting results from different econometric
approaches may be complementary.
11Favero–Giavazzi simulate the debt series back to 1947 using annual data.
12To make it harder for the model to match the point estimates, the IRFs are shown with one-standard
deviation error bands. These have been common in this branch of the fiscal policy literature following Blanchard
and Perotti (2002).
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Figure 1 shows the response of the other fiscal policy variables to the shock. The response of
the labor and capital tax rates, although positive (as one might expect) are relatively modest.
Given the modest increase in taxes, it is also useful to consider the response of debt. To the
extent that lump sum taxes are rarely used to satisfy the government budget constraint, modest
tax rate increases would imply a larger increase in debt. This is indeed what is observed in the
fourth panel of Figure 1.
Figure 2 shows the responses of the other variables in the SVAR. The top two panels show
the familiar SVAR result that output and consumption rise following a government spending
shock.13 The output response on impact is 0.2, which implies an output multiplier on impact
of around one. This paper focuses directly on the impulse response functions from the VAR
and the model, although these can always be converted into “multipliers”. There is, of course,
a wider literature on multipliers, both on impact and in present value terms see, for example,
Leeper et al. (2011).
Consumption exhibits the hump-shaped response often seen in SVAR results. The invest-
ment response is generally negative, a feature often found elsewhere, although the response
is quite noisy and relatively imprecise.14 Interestingly the labor market responses are weaker,
although the point estimates are generally still positive. These findings are comparable with
the wider literature, such as Perotti (2007) and Monacelli and Perotti (2009). For the purpose
of the next section, I take these findings as empirical regularities for the model to match.
3 The model
As discussed in the introduction, this paper focuses on whether a New Keynesian model can
explain the empirical evidence for a realistic set of parameter values. However, to directly
address the issues raised earlier, I particularly focus on the role of distortionary capital and
labor tax rates and allow for endogenous tax rate responses to government spending shocks. I
also employ Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) preferences which allow the strength of the wealth
13In contrast, using a narrative approach based on military expenditures, Ramey (2011) shows that consump-
tion may actually fall following a government spending shock.
14Cloyne (2013) also finds this to be the case for investment following tax changes.
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effect on labor supply to vary. Finally, the model includes a range of more standard features
such as sticky prices, variable capital utilisation and habits.
3.1 Households
Households derive utility from consumption (C) and leisure (1−N). The household maximises
lifetime utility
max
Ct,Nt,It,zt,Kt+1,Bt+1
Et
∞∑
t=s
βt−su(Ct+s, 1−Nt+s), (2)
subject to a budget constraint (in real terms)
Ct + It +
Bt+1
Rt
= Bt + wtNt(1− τNt ) + rKt (zt)(1− τKt )Kt − Tt. (3)
The capital stock evolves according to
Kt+1 = (1− δ(zt))Kt + It
(
1− φ
(
It
It−1
− 1
))
, (4)
which incorporates adjustment costs employed by Christiano et al. (2005), among others. The
utility function, u : R2 → R, is assumed to be concave and twice continuously differentiable.
The function φ satisfies φ = φ′ = 0 and φ′′ > 0.
Kt+1 denotes capital held by households at the end of period t and Bt+1 are real holdings
of government bonds, also at the end of period t. Ct is consumption, It is investment, Rt is the
aggregate real interest rate (gross), wt is the aggregate real wage and r
K
t is the real return on
capital. τKt and τ
N
t are the tax rates on capital and labor income respectively. Tt are lump sum
taxes. δ is the rate of depreciation.
The parametric specification for the utility function u(·) follows Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2009), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) and Monacelli and Perotti (2009).
U(Ct, Nt) =
(Ct − hC˜t−1 − ψN ξtXt)1−σ
1− σ (5)
where
Xt = (Ct − hC˜t−1)γX1−γt−1 . (6)
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For γ = 1 and h = 0 these preferences become those considered by King et al. (1988). For γ = 0
and h = 0 they become the preferences considered by Greenwood et al. (1988) (henceforth
GHH).15 The latter preferences exhibit no wealth effect on labor supply. In other words, labor
supply is solely affected by the real wage (net of taxes) and not by the level of consumption.
I have modified the Jaimovich–Rebelo preferences to include habits. C˜t−1 is aggregate con-
sumption in the previous period and the consumer takes this as given. Below I show that
internal habits, where consumers explicitly consider Ct−1 in their optimisation decisions, would
reintroduce the wealth effect on labor supply when γ = 0.
The model also features variable capital utilisation. High utilisation by firms implies greater
depreciation of a given stock of capital. For this reason both the return on capital and the
depreciation are functions of utilisation, captured by the variable zt.
3.1.1 First order conditions
The first order conditions for the household’s problem, with respect to Ct, Xt, Bt+1, Nt, It,
Kt+1 and zt are:
λt = (Ct − hC˜t−1 − ψN ξtXt)−σ + µtγ(Ct − hC˜t−1)γ−1X1−γt−1 (7)
(Ct − hC˜t−1 − ψN ξtXt)−σψN ξt + µt = βEt(µt+1(1− γ)(Ct − hC˜t−1)γX−γt (8)
Et
(
λt+1
λt
)
=
1
Rtβ
(9)
ψN ξ−1t ξXt(Ct − hC˜t−1 − ψN ξtXt)−σ = λtwt(1− τnt ) (10)
1− qt
((
1− φ
(
It
It−1
))
− φ′
(
It
It−1
)(
It
It−1
))
= Et
(
qt+1
λt+1
λt
β
[
I2t+1
I2t
φ′
(
It+1
It
)])
(11)
qt = βEt
λt+1
λt
(
rKt+1(1− τKt+1) + qt+1(1− δ(zt))
)
(12)
r′Kt (zt) = qtδ
′(zt) (13)
where r′K is the derivative of the return on capital with respect to utilisation. µt is the La-
grange multiplier on the evolution of Xt (equation (6)) and qt is the multiplier on the capital
accumulation equation and reflects Tobin’s marginal q.
15One reason against simply using GHH preferences is that they fail to satisfy the conditions for balanced
growth, see King and Rebelo (1999) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009).
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3.1.2 The variable wealth effect
Consider the extreme case where γ = 0. The preferences are then of the GHH-form and the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is independent of consumption.
To see this, combine the first order condition with respect to consumption with the first order
condition with respect to labor supply:
ψN ξ−1t ξXt(Ct − hC˜t−1 − ψN ξtXt)−σ = (Ct − hC˜t−1 − ψN ξtXt)−σwt(1− τnt ) (14)
noting
λt = (Ct − hC˜t−1 − ψN ξtXt)−σ. (15)
This implies that
ψξN ξ−1t = wt(1− τnt ). (16)
At an unchanged real wage and tax rate, hours do not change. In a simple graphical rep-
resentation without capital, this implies that the labor supply curve does not shift outwards
as consumption falls (the key neoclassical channel). Under Jaimovich–Rebelo preferences, in-
creasing γ from zero raises the strength of the wealth effect on labor supply and this feature is
preserved under the habits specification introduced above. Note, however, that this would not
be true with internal habits. For γ = 0, λt would then become:
λt = (Ct − hC˜t−1 − ψN ξt )−σ − Etλt+1hβ(Ct+1 − hC˜t − ψN ξt+1)−σ. (17)
The first order condition for labor supply would be unchanged. This implies that λt would no
longer cancel in equation (14) and labor supply once again depends on consumption.
3.2 Firms
There are a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms producing final output indexed on
the unit interval. The consumer’s problem can still be formulated as above but note that each
individual actually purchases a bundle of differentiated goods
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Ct(i) where i refers to a
particular firm. For each variety of goods the consumption demand function is:
Ct(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−
Ct, (18)
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where
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−di
) 1
1−
(19)
and  is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods.
The minimum expenditure required to purchase a bundle of goods resulting in Ct units of
the composite good is given by PtCt and so the consumer’s budget constraint can be written as
before.16
The demand for the ith product (the output of firm i) is given by
Yt(i) =
(
pt(i)
Pt
)−
Y dt , (20)
where Y dt is aggregate demand. The resource constraint is
Yt = Ct + It +Gt. (21)
Cost minimization with respect to Nt(i), Kt(i) and zt(i) subject to firm i’s production
function Yt(i) = [zt(i)Kt(i)]
αNt(i)
(1−α) implies
wt = mct(i)(1− α) Yt(i)
Nt(i)
(22)
rKt = mct(i)α
Yt(i)
Kt(i)
, (23)
and
mct(i)α
Yt(i)
zt(i)
=
qtδ
′(zt(i))kt(i)
(1− τKt )
(24)
where mct(i) is real marginal cost and equation (24) makes use of equation (13).
Sticky prices are introduced following Calvo (1983). Firms can adjust their price with
probability η. When firms are able to reset their price they choose P ∗t (i) to maximize expected
profits
maxEt
∞∑
j=0
Qt,t+jη
j
[
(1− τP )P ∗t+j(i)Yt+j(i)−MCt+j(i)Yt+j(i) + T Pt+j
]
(25)
16The consumer’s problem technically also includes non-zero profits Πt which I assume are equally distributed
lump sum to all consumers. This does not affect the first order conditions.
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subject to
Yt+j(i) =
(
Pt+j(i)
Pt+j
)−
Y dt+j,
where MCt is nominal marginal cost. τ
P and T P are a tax and lump sum subsidy, which
removes the steady state markup distortion.
The first order condition for firm i’s price setting problem is the familiar New Keynesian
optimal reset price:
P ∗t (i) =
Et
∑∞
j=0 η
jQt,t+jMCt+1Yt+j(i)
Et
∑∞
j=0 η
jQt,t+jYt+j(i)
. (26)
Finally, the price index is an aggregate of firms who reset their price today and those who
must retain last period’s prices:
Pt =
[
ηP 1−t−1 + (1− η)P ∗(1−)t
] 1
1−
. (27)
3.3 Policy
The government can finance spending, G, through a mixture of bond supply B, labor and
capital income taxes τN , τK or lump sum taxes T , such that the government budget constraint
is satisfied
Bt+1
Rt
= Bt +Gt − τNt Ntwt − τKt KtrKt − Tt. (28)
Tax rules are necessary to specify how the government splits its financing between the various
policy instruments. I assume tax rates respond to a proportion of the spending increase and
these responses are persistent. τˆ are tax rates as the percentage point deviation from steady
state, and all other lower case letters as percentage deviation from steady state. Following
13
McGrattan (1994) I employ an AR(2) structure for the linearized tax rules as follows:17
τˆNt = θ
τN,1 τˆNt−1 + θ
τN,2 τˆNt−2 + θ
nggt (29)
τˆKt = θ
τK,1 τˆKt−1 + θ
τK,2 τˆKt−2 + θ
kggt (30)
I follow Reis (2008) in making government spending ARMA(1,1)
gt = φ1gt−1 + φ2at, (31)
where at is an AR(1) process with a white noise shock and the persistence is governed by
parameter ρ. Lump sum taxes are not used, as discussed in the introduction.
Monetary policy follows a familiar Taylor rule. In percentage deviations from steady state
the nominal interest rate rt is set as follows:
18
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr)(φpipit + φyyt). (32)
3.4 The linearized model
The model is linearized around its steady state and solved. Details of the linearized system
and the steady state are given in Appendices B and C. Of particular interest are the linearized
equations governing price evolution, utilisation and investment (recall, lower case letters repre-
sent percentage deviations from steady state). The first is the New Keynesian Phillips Curve.
Note that the degree of price stickiness, η, appears in this expression and will be estimated.
pit =
(1− βη)(1− η)
η
mct + βEtpit+1. (33)
17Mertens and Ravn (2011) also employ an AR(2) specification. In principle, I could consider a more general
rule with feedback from output and debt. However, since I am matching the empirical path of taxes and debt
from the SVAR, in practice this makes little difference as I show in Appendix D. In the baseline model I back
out the path for debt after solving the model. In the appendix, the model also explicitly includes debt and
feedback in the tax rules.
18To limit the number of parameters estimated I will, in the baseline specification, consider the case with
φpi = 1.5 only. However, in Appendix D I show this makes little difference to the results of the model, when all
parameters of this rule are estimated.
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The degree of capital utilisation, zt, is described by
(1 + κ)zt = yt − kt − qt +mct − τKt
1
1− τK , (34)
where κ = δ
′′
δ′ is the elasticity of depreciation to utilisation, and will also be estimated. Invest-
ment evolves according to
qt
φ′′
= (1 + β)it − it−1 − βEtit+1 (35)
and 1
φ′′ = µ will be estimated.
4 Key features of the model
4.1 The wealth effect channel
Figures (3) to (7) illustrate the effect of turning on each mechanism in the model one at a time
while still assuming that lump sum taxes or debt funds the spending shock.19
In Figure (3), the model has flexible prices (η = 0), no variable capital utilisation (κ =∞)
and no habit formation (h = 0). γ = 1, so there is a standard wealth effect on labor supply.
This case can therefore be regarded as a simple baseline neoclassical model. Figure (3) shows
the familiar neoclassical result. The higher lump sum taxes that accompany the spending shock
lower lifetime wealth, lower consumption, lower savings and hence investment, but boost labor
supply. The real wage therefore falls. Figure (4), however, illustrates the effect of turning off
the wealth effect on labor supply, i.e. setting γ = 0. Labor supply now does not respond to the
lower lifetime wealth. Consumption and investment are even lower than before, reflecting the
decrease in lifetime wealth and the lack of increased earnings from supplying more labor. All
these forces cause output to fall over time. Importantly, the neoclassical model can no longer
match the empirical output response. In fact the neoclassical model without a wealth effect on
labor supply fails to qualitatively match any of the output, consumption, real wage or hours
responses estimated in Section 2. Unlike in Burnside et al. (2004) or Baxter and King (1993),
even debt financed increases will be contractionary.
19Without distortionary taxes, lump sum tax and debt financing is equivalent due to Ricardian equivalence.
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Figure (5) shows the result of adding sticky prices to the previous model (γ = 0). As
Figure (5) illustrates, government spending now has a positive effect on demand which boosts
output, labor demand, hours worked, the real wage, and consumption. The figure illustrates
the Monacelli and Perotti (2009) result that consumption can rise following the shock. Without
a wealth effect on labor supply the real wage does not fall on impact. The sticky price demand
effect then induces an outward shift of the labor demand curve, raising real wages, hours and
consumption.
Adding variable capital utilisation to the model serves to increase the persistence of these
effects and moderates the volatility in investment, as can be seen from Figure (6). Finally, the
inclusion of habits adds persistence to the consumption profile, with additional implications for
overall demand. This can be seen from Figure (7).
4.2 Fiscal financing
I now consider how the choice of tax and debt instruments affects the model’s predictions. Figure
(8) illustrates the effect of assuming that the two distortionary tax rates increase following the
spending shock. For this exercise I arbitrarily choose θgn = θgk = 0.6. The figure illustrates
the strong negative effect on output and consumption of using distortionary taxes, relative to
Figure (7). In short, the results in the previous section depend not only on the strength of
the wealth effect on labor supply, but also — quite dramatically — on the instruments used to
finance the shock. I now consider the two types of taxes individually.
Consider the effects of a rise in the labor income tax rate. There are two substitution
effects. First, the intra-temporal decision is distorted and labor supply falls. In other words,
it is more costly to supply labor today as the worker pays higher taxes per hour. Second, the
inter-temporal decision is distorted if the tax rate is changing over time (as it may be when the
tax rules are estimated). For a rising (falling) tax profile the worker may still prefer (dislike) to
work today as it will be relatively less (more) costly than tomorrow. These substitution effects
work to offset any wealth effect on labor supply and in the simulations below, labor supply falls
considerably following a rise in government spending.
To illustrate the effect, I calibrate the coefficient on gt in the labor tax rule to be 0.95, leaving
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the equivalent parameter zero in the capital tax rule. Figure (9) shows the strong negative effect
of this change in the tax policy rule. The positive effects on output, consumption and hours in
the previous section are now reversed in the presence of labor income tax-finance. Note that
saving becomes more attractive which, over time, raises investment.
I now turn to examine the effect of using capital taxes. Figure (10) shows the effect of cali-
brating the coefficient on gt in the capital tax rate rule to 0.95, leaving the equivalent coefficient
zero in the labor tax rule. Interestingly, the use of capital taxes raises consumption and output
on impact but lowers the persistence. This effect is a combination of substitution effects and
sticky prices (and habits). Taxing capital makes consumption relatively more attractive than
saving. As a result, ceteris paribus, the balance between consumption and saving tilts towards
consumption. This increase in demand, given sticky prices, boosts output in the short run. If
prices were flexible, the increase in capital taxes would tend to lower consumption and output
as the capital stock declines.
A number of important implications arise from the model. First, as expected, deficit fi-
nancing minimizes the contemporaneous distortions associated with labor and capital taxes.
This means that deficit financed spending increases tend to be expansionary, and distortionary
tax funded increases tend to be contractionary (as in Baxter and King (1993)), and even in
my model with sticky prices. Second, the type of tax matters: labor income taxes produce a
strong negative effect on all the key variables, while capital income taxes may raise the impact
stimulus by boosting consumption, but will lower the persistence of the effect on output as the
capital stock declines faster. Third, deficit financed spending increases may be expansionary
due to a wealth effect on labor supply. But if this channel is weak in practice, sticky prices may
become important for explaining the expansionary effects of a spending shock on output found
in Section 2.
In short, the choice of tax instruments and the degree of debt-financing matters greatly, as
does the strength of the wealth effect on labor supply. In fact, the model’s results are highly
dependent on these parameters. However, there is no a priori reason to calibrate either the
tax policy rules in a particular way, or to assume a particular strength for the wealth effect
channel. To properly evaluate the ability of the model to explain the effects of a government
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spending shock, arbitrarily calibrating these key parameters will not be enlightening. Estimation
is therefore the most appropriate strategy to follow.
5 Estimation
As discussed above, without a good a priori reason to calibrate key parts of the model in a
particular way, I estimate the model using a minimum distance approach as discussed by, for
example, Christiano et al. (2005). Key parameters of the model are chosen to minimize the
distance between the model’s impulse responses and the empirical impulse responses.
As discussed in the introduction, the contribution of this paper is to examine the transmission
mechanisms of fiscal policy using a New Keynesian DSGE model and whether a relatively
standard model can explain time series evidence for reasonable parameter values. In particular,
I focus on the role of financing and how this interacts with the wealth effect channel. Minimum
distance estimation methods are therefore very appealing for this exercise. I do not use the
model itself to identify the response of the macroeconomy to government spending shocks in
the data, as in the full information estimation literature (such as Leeper et al. (2010)).20
The model’s parameters are partitioned into two blocks. The first block includes a set of
parameters which are calibrated. The second block includes parameters to be estimated. I
estimate all the parameters of the fiscal policy rules. I also estimate the parameters of the key
mechanisms in the model: γ governing the size of the wealth effect, κ determining the degree
of variable capital utilisation, µ determining the strength of the investment adjustment costs, η
the degree of price stickiness and the habit persistence parameter h. The parameter vector to
be estimated is therefore21
ζ = [φ1 φ2 θ
gn θn1 θn2 θgk θk1 θk2 η κ γ h µ].
Let the empirical impulse responses be stacked in a vector x¯. The model produces impulse
responses conditional on a set of parameters. Let the parameter vector be ζ as above. Let the
20And therefore, while this paper has similarities with that literature, the goal and contribution differs.
21For a list of parameter definitions see Table 1.
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output of the model given the set of parameters be x(ζ). The objective is to choose parameters
to minimize the loss function
ζ = arg min
ζ
[x¯− x(ζ)]V −1[x¯− x(ζ)]′, (36)
where V is a weighting matrix which includes the variances of the empirical impulses along the
diagonal and zeros elsewhere. The purpose of this matrix is to down-weight observations with
larger standard errors. As such, I ensure that the estimated model’s responses lie as far inside
the empirical confidence intervals as possible.
I match the model’s impulse responses to the first 16 periods of the nine empirical impulse
responses. Dropping any observation with zero variance from the loss function (the first element
of the government spending series) leaves the x vectors ((9 × 16) − 1) × 1 and the V matrix
((9× 16)− 1)× ((9× 16)− 1) in dimension.
The standard errors are calculated following Hall et al. (2012). Specifically the variance-
covariance matrix of the estimated parameters is found as the solution to:
Vζ =
[
∂x(ζ)
∂ζ
′
W−1
∂x(ζ)
∂ζ
]−1
(37)
where W is the variance-covariance matrix of the impulse response functions and ∂x(ζ)
∂ζ
is the
((9× 16)− 1)× 9 Jacobian of the theoretical impulse responses with respect to the parameter
vector.
5.1 Results
The estimated parameter values are given in Table (2). The tax rate responses to the government
spending shock are estimated to be small, although the response builds over time — as can
be seen from the coefficients on the lagged tax rates. Figure (11) displays the matched policy
responses implied by the estimated model, together with the confidence intervals from the SVAR.
The estimated fiscal policy parameters in Table (2) generate responses within the empirical
confidence intervals and are thus a decent replication of the empirical policy responses. I also plot
the simulated debt path from the model given the spending and tax rate changes. Interestingly,
based on the model’s estimated parameters, these tax rate changes are also consistent with the
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empirically estimated response of debt from Section 2. This reaffirms that spending shocks are
typically funded more through debt than through contemporaneous tax changes.
Table (2) also reports the other estimated parameter values and their standard errors. It
is worth comparing these with values discussed elsewhere. King and Rebelo (1999) take κ ∈
[0.1,∞] and the value in Table (2) is close to the value of 0.15 used by Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2009). η is of the order of magnitude usually used in New Keynesian models and is similar to
the value of 0.83 estimated by Altig et al. (2004). The estimate for γ implies a very small wealth
effect on labor supply and not statistically significant from zero. This reinforces the results of
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012). h is similar to the value of 0.7 used by Monacelli and Perotti
(2009) and is a fairly standard figure found in the wider literature.
Figure (12) displays the responses of the other key macroeconomic variables. Again, the
estimated model produces responses largely within the confidence intervals. It is noteworthy
that the estimated model jointly replicates the output and consumption responses, which is
often a problem for New Keynesian models. Although the hours response is at the upper end
of the one-standard deviation error bands, most of the real wage response is well matched. The
investment response continues to decline over time, although these dynamics partly reflect the
investment adjustment cost mechanism used.
5.2 Robustness
I now examine the robustness of the parameter estimates when each of the main mechanisms
discussed earlier are turned off or directly calibrated.22 Table (3) displays the results.
First consider the fiscal policy parameters. Estimates of the persistence of the government
spending process (ρ and φ1) are very similar across all specifications. So too is the impact
response of the tax rates following the spending shock (θgk and θgn). The persistence coefficients
in the tax rules do vary somewhat, although these estimates still produce impulse responses
within the empirical confidence intervals.
In all cases the strength of the wealth effect on labor supply is estimated to be low. This
mirrors findings by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012). Furthermore, note that the loss increases
22Parameter values used in Table (3) reflect commonly chosen values elsewhere in the literature.
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significantly when γ is forced to be one, the case of King-Plosser-Rebelo-type preferences. The
degree of price stickiness is estimated to be high across all specifications, suggesting an important
role for short-run demand effects. However, when other mechanisms are turned off — notably
variable capital utilisation — the degree of price stickiness becomes implausibly high. It is also
interesting to note that the flexible price model (where η = 0) does not perform too badly (in
terms of loss). This, however, relies on an implausibly high level of variable capital utilisation
and strong habit persistence. Similarly, estimates of the habit persistence parameter increase
significantly when sticky prices or variable capital utilisation are turned off. In general, when
turning off particular mechanisms in the model, the parameter estimates governing variable
capital utilisation and the investment adjustment costs, κ and µ, become very low. This suggests
that the mechanisms employed in the model are all jointly important in explaining the dynamics
of the macroeconomy following a shock to government spending.
These exercises confirm several important results. Firstly, that the strength of wealth effect
on labor supply is robustly low across all specifications. Secondly, that the strength of the
tax rate response to government spending shocks is consistently limited, so spending shocks
are largely debt financed in the short term. And, thirdly, all the model’s mechanisms appear
important for matching the empirical evidence with familiar parameter values: the baseline case
achieves the smallest loss.
6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the transmission mechanisms of fiscal policy and whether a rela-
tively standard New Keynesian DSGE model can explain the empirical evidence for reasonable
parameter values. In particular I focused on the role of financing and the wealth effect channel.
This paper has shown that the mix of policy instruments matters greatly for the sign and
magnitude of key responses. For example, greater use of labor income taxes causes a contraction
in output, consumption, the real wage and hours, all contrary to the empirical evidence presented
in Section 2. Furthermore, when only part of the spending increase is financed by distortionary
taxes on impact, the wealth effect on labor supply can still play a critical role in boosting
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output. Without an a priori reason to calibrate these features of the model in a particular way,
this paper has empirically investigated the importance of the endogenous tax and debt response
and the strength of the wealth effect channel in the United States.
A number of transmission mechanisms are found to be important for allowing the estimated
model to replicate the empirical responses. First, the wealth effect on labor supply is estimated
to be small. This casts doubt on whether a plain vanilla neoclassical model would be able
replicate the empirical evidence. Second, sticky prices, variable capital utilisation, investment
adjustment costs and habits were all found to play a key role, with parameter values in line with
those found in the wider literature. Third, I find that while distortionary tax rates rise following
the spending shock, their magnitudes are modest. Importantly, capital tax rates increase more
than labor tax rates, limiting the contractionary effect on output and consumption in the short
run. The model implies a realistic debt path on the basis of these tax rate changes. All these
results imply that the debt-financed nature of the spending increase is important in explaining
the expansionary effects, although these expansionary effects do not depend on the wealth effect
channel, but rather the presence of sticky prices.
This paper has focused on the shorter-term effects of a shock to government spending. To
the extent that nominal rigidities allow for short-run demand effects and, to the extent that
the wealth effect on labor supply is small, my results suggest that debt-financed government
spending shocks will stimulate output, consumption, hours and the real wage over the short
term. However, as pointed out by Drautzburg and Uhlig (2013), spending increases ultimately
need to be financed and the tax increases required place a welfare cost on the economy. Any
short-term benefits of a stimulus to GDP or consumption therefore need to be traded-off against
the long-term, and welfare, costs. Striking this balance clearly remains hugely topical in the
current climate.
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7 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Baseline calibration
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Discount factor
α 0.3 Capital share
δ 0.025 Steady state depreciation
τK 0 Steady state capital tax rate (from sample)
τN 0 Steady state labor tax rate (from sample)
N 0.3 Steady state labor
G
Y
0.2 Steady state share of government spending
B
Y
1.6 Steady state debt to GDP ratio (quarterly)
σ 1 Inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substitution (γ = 1)
ξ 1.8 Parameter governing Frisch elasticity of labor supply (γ = 0)
φpi 1.5 Coefficient on inflation in the monetary policy rule
ρ 0.8 Autoregressive parameter on at shock
η 0.75 Probability of having a fixed price
κ 0.15 Parameter governing capital utilisation
µ 1/3 Parameter governing the investment adjustment costs
γ 0.01 Parameter governing the wealth effect
h 0.5 Parameter governing habit persistence
27
Table 2: Estimated parameter values
Parameter Estimation Description
ρ 0.94 (0.02) Persistence of shock process
φ1 0.00 (0.08) Persistence of spending process
φ2 -0.14 (0.06) Effect of shock on spending
θgn 0.0043 (0.02) Contemporaneous response of the labor tax rate
θgk 0.0046 (0.002) Contemporaneous response of the capital tax rate
θτ
N,1
0.19 (0.1) Labor tax rate AR(1) coefficient
θτ
K,1
1.87 (0.07) Capital tax rate AR(1) coefficient
θτ
N,2
0.038 (0.1) Labor tax rate AR(2) coefficient
θτ
K,2
-0.91 (0.07) Capital tax rate AR(2) coefficient
γ 0.0023 (0.003) Strength of the wealth effect
h 0.58 (0.06) Strength of habits
η 0.86 (0.04) Probability of a fixed price
κ 0.16 (0.33) Governs capital utilisation
µ 0.032 (0.03) Governs investment adjustment costs
Loss 51.52
Table 4: Data sources
Series Source Description
Gov. spending BEA Gov. cons. expenditures and gross inv. (CVM)
Capital taxes BEA Constructed as above
Labor taxes BEA Constructed as above
Output BEA Gross domestic product (CVM)
Real wage BLS BLS Series ID: PRS85006153
Hours Unpublished BLS Francis-Ramey “Measures of Hours per Capita”
Consumption BEA Personal consumption expenditures (CVM)
Investment BEA Gross private domestic investment (CVM)
Debt Treasury Bulletin Close to ‘Debt Held by the Public’
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Figure 1: Impulse responses for the fiscal policy variables
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Figure 2: Impulse responses for key macroeconomic variables
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Figure 3: A simple Neoclassical model: η = 0, γ = 1, κ =∞, h = 0
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Figure 4: A simple Neoclassical model (but no wealth effect): η = 0, γ = 0, κ =∞, h = 0
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Figure 5: Including sticky prices: η = 0.7
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Figure 6: Including variable capital utilization: κ = 0.15
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Figure 7: The full (lump sum tax) model: including habits: h = 0.5
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Figure 8: Distortionary labor and capital tax rates respond
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Figure 9: Only the labor income tax rate responds
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Figure 10: Only the capital tax rate responds
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Figure 11: Responses of the fiscal variables given the parameter estimates
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Figure 12: Responses of the other variables given the parameter estimates
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Appendices
A Data Appendix
The data span the period 1955:1 to 2007:4 and the variable definitions keep close Blanchard and
Perotti (2002), where relevant. Real government spending, real consumption, real investment
and real GDP come directly from the Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA tables. All variables
are the log of real per capita variables. Nominal variables are deflated by their own implicit price
deflators with the exception of government spending which is deflated by the GDP deflator. Real
hours are an unpublished Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) series, downloadable from Valerie
Ramey’s website. The real wage is real hourly compensation, non-farm business, in logs from
the BLS. Population is total civilian population also from the BLS.
Real per capita debt is the log of my constructed debt measure divided by the total popula-
tion and the GDP deflator. The debt measure is very close the ‘Debt Held by the Public’. This
series is only available from 1970, so I construct a proxy from old editions of the United States
Treasury Bulletin back to 1947. For the pre-1974 period this is the ‘Total Public Issues’ series.
After 1974, for consistency, I have to construct the ‘Total Public Issues’ series from the Monthly
Statement of Public Debt by combining ‘Total Interest Bearing Debt’ minus the ‘Government
Accounts Series’ plus ‘Total Treasury Deposit Funds’. Because this is not an exact match to
‘Debt Held by the Public’ I check how close the two measures are (for the common part of the
series, 1970 onwards) — the R squared is 0.999, so I am confident that my constructed series
reflects changes in ‘Debt Held By the Public’.
The capital and labor income tax rates are constructed following Jones (2002), which in turn
is related to Mendoza et al. (1994). I reconstruct the series, extend it back to 1947 following
Burnside et al. (2004) and forward to 2008. As a check, I reproduce the narrative Vector
Autoregression results in Burnside et al. (2004), the results are very similar. These extra results
are available on request.
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B Linearized models
B.1 Notation
Lower case letters represent the percentage deviation of each variable from its steady state
value. The only exceptions are the tax rates τNt and τ
K
t which are expressed as percentage
point deviations to match the variable definition in the VAR.
B.2 The consumer’s conditions
B.2.1 Households
a1ct + a2nt + a3xt + a4xt−1 + a5µt − a6λt + a7ct−1 = 0 (38)
λt + wt − 1
1− τN τ
N
t = b1ct + b2nt + b3xt + b4ct−1 (39)
c1ct + c2nt + c3xt + c6ct−1 + µµt = c4µt+1 + c5ct+1 (40)
Etλt+1 = λt − rt (41)
(1− h)xt = (1− h)(1− γ)xt−1 + γct − hγct−1 (42)
µqt − (1 + β)it + it−1 − βEtit+1 = 0 (43)
where µ = 1
φ′′ .
qt + rt = r
K(1− τK)βEtrKt+1 − βrKEtτKt+1 + β(1− δ)Etqt+1 − βδ′(z)zEtzt+1 (44)
where the coefficients are given at the end of this appendix.
B.3 Firms
Up to a first order approximation the aggregate production function is given by
yt = αzt + αkt + (1− α)nt (45)
and factors are paid
rKt = mct + yt − kt (46)
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wt = mct + yt − nt. (47)
Utilisation is described by
(1 + κ)zt = yt − kt − qt +mct − 1
1− τK τ
K
t (48)
where ξ = δ
′′
δ′ . Price evolution is determined by the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
pit = βEtpit+1 +
(1− η)(1− βη)
η
mct. (49)
B.4 Policy rules
rt − Etpit+1 = φpipit (50)
τnt = θ
gngt + θ
bnbt + θ
n1τnt−1 + θ
n2τnt−2 (51)
τ kt = θ
gkgt + θ
bkbt + θ
k1τ kt−1 + θ
k2τnt−2 (52)
gt = φ1gt−1 + φ2at (53)
T
Y
Tˆt =
B
Y
1
R
(bt+1 + rt)− B
Y
bt =
G
Y
gt − (1− α)τn(τnt + nt + wt)− ατ k(τ kt + rkt + kt). (54)
B.5 Identities
δit = kt+1 − (1− δ)kt (55)
yt =
C
Y
ct +
I
Y
it +
G
Y
gt. (56)
B.6 Stochastic processes
at+1 = ρat + t+1 (57)
B.7 Coefficients from the linearized Jaimovich–Rebelo preferences
a1 = (γ − 1)µγX1−γ(C(1− h))γ−2C − σCχ(C − hC − ψN ξX)−1
a2 = ξψN
ξXσ(C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1
a3 = ψN
ξXσ(C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1
39
a4 = (1− γ)µγX1−γ(C(1− h))γ−1
a5 = µγX
1−γ(C(1− h))γ−1
a6 = µγX
1−γ(C(1− h))γ−1 + χ
a7 = −ha1
b1 = −(σψN ξ−ξX((C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1)C)/(a6W (1− τN))
b2 = ((ξ − 1)ψXN ξ−1ξχ+ σψ2N2ξ−1ξ2X2(C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1)/(a6W (1− τN))
b3 = X(ψN
ξ−1ξχ+ ψN ξ−1ξX(σ((C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1)ψN ξ))/(a6W (1− τN))
b4 = −hb1
c1 = −σψN ξ(C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1C + h(1− γ)µβγ(C(1− h))γ−1X−γC
c2 = ψ
2ξXσN2ξ(C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1 + ξψN ξχ
c3 = σψ
2N2ξ(C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1X + γµβ(1− γ)(C(1− h))γX−γ
c4 = µβ(1− γ)(C(1− h))γX−γ
c5 = γµβ(1− γ)(C(1− h))γ−1X−γC
c6 = σhψN
ξ(C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ−1C
χ = (C − hC − ψN ξX)−σ
C Steady state
Our assumptions of φ(I/K) imply that
I
K
= δ
therefore
I
Y
=
I
K
K
Y
= δ
K
Y
.
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Given the tax and subsidy on revenue (mc = 1), the state version of the return on capital
implies
rK = α
Y
K
.
From equation (12)
rK =
R− 1 + δ
1− τK (58)
therefore
K
Y
=
α
rK
(59)
and
I
Y
=
δα
rK
. (60)
The share of consumption can be written
C
Y
= 1− δK
Y
− G
Y
, (61)
This follows from the resource constraint, equation (21). ψ can be found by solving the house-
hold’s steady state first order conditions
ψ =
(
N ξ
[
ξX
W (1− τN)N −
γX1−γ(C(1− h))γ−1
β(1− γ)(C(1− h))γX−γ − 1
])−1
(62)
where N is steady state hours and is calibrated. From the production function and the marginal
product of capital is
K =
(
rK
α
)( 1α−1)
N, (63)
and dividing the resource constraint by K gives an expression for CK. Using this together with
equation (63) yields an expression for steady state consumption. The steady state real wage
follows from
W = (1− α)
(
K
N
)α
. (64)
µ is the steady state Lagrange multiplier
µ =
ψN ξχ
β(1− γ)(C(1− h))γX−γ − 1 . (65)
From equation (6), steady state X is given by:
X = C(1− h). (66)
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The steady state gross real interest rate is related to the discount factor
R =
1
β
. (67)
From the first order condition for zt
δ′(z)z = (1− τK)αY
K
. (68)
B
Y
is calibrated.
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D More general policy rules
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